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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this court by Utah Code Ann., Sec. 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly dismiss Plaintiffs first, second and third causes of 
action based upon retained immunity, and for failure to comply with procedural requirements, 
under the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah? 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in dismissing the action with prejudice for 
failure to prosecute? In reviewing a trial court's decision to dismiss for failure to prosecute, the 
appellate court accords the trial court broad discretion and does not disturb its decision absent 
an abuse of discretion and a likelihood that an injustice has occurred. See, Hartford Leasing 
Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 694, 697-698 (Utah App. 1994); see also, Charlie Brown Constr. Co. 
v. Leisure Sports, Inc., 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 
1987). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case 
Appellant Butler Crockett & Walsh Development Corporation [BC&W] filed this action 
to contest a county land-use decision by Appellee Salt Lake County [the County] denying 
BC&W's application for conditional use permit [CUP]. BC&W now appeals from the trial 
court's dismissal of its action. The dismissal order was entered in two stages: (1) the trial court, 
on the County's 12(b)(6) motion, dismissed BC&W's purported "breach of contract" claims 
based on governmental immunity (i.e., its first, second and third causes of action), but allowed 
BC&W to refile its action (on its fourth, fifth and sixth causes of action) as an appeal of local 
land-use decision, while not opining as to whether the appeal would be timely; and (2) after 
BC&W failed to timely file a petition for review of a local land-use decision, failed to take any 
further action to prosecute its remaining claims, and failed to appear at an Order to Show Cause 
hearing, the court dismissed the action for failure to prosecute. 
In this appeal, the trial court's decisions should be affirmed on the grounds that BC&W 
has made no attempt to show any legal or factual basis suggesting that the trial court misapplied 
the law or abused its discretion in dismissing the action for failure to prosecute. 
2. Course of Proceedings and Statement of Facts l 
1. October 24, 1995: BC&W filed an application to use its property in Emigration 
!The "course of proceedings" and "statement of facts" sections required by Utah R. 
App. P., Rule 24(a)(7) are combined herein inasmuch as the relevant facts and the course 
of judicial proceedings in this case are essentially the same. 
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Canyon as a "Tourist Home," a conditional use under the county zoning ordinance. R. 2, f^ 9. 
2. Thereafter, the County denied BC&W's application for a Conditional Use Permit 
[CUP]. 
3. June 14,2000: BC&W filed this action for damages, alleging the following causes 
of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) unjust enrichment; (3) breach of covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing; (4) denial of the CUP as "arbitrary, capricious and illegal"; (5) violation of due 
process and equal protection; (6) violation of "Plaintiff s civil rights as violated (sic) 42 USC 
1983 and related statutes and regulations." [R. 1-7] BC&W's action sought damages of 
$100,000.00 "plus such other and additional sums as established at the time fo trial." Id.. 
4. July 18.2000: The County filed a motion to dismiss. [R. 8-10] 
5. August 31, 2000: The County filed a Notice to Submit for Decision regarding its 
motion to dismiss. [R. 34-35] 
6. July 16. 2002: The trial court issued a notice of order to show cause [OSC], and 
scheduled an OSC hearing for September 16, 2002. [R. 45 - 46] 
7. December 19. 2002: The County filed its second Notice to Submit for Decision 
regarding its motion to dismiss. [R. 51 - 53] 
8. January 3.2003: The trial court, by Judge Robert K. Hilder, entered the following 
minute entry: 
"Defendant has submitted its Motion to Dismiss for decision, for a second time. 
The case, and the Motion, has languished for over two years. The prior judge 
apparently never saw the Motion, and he subsequently retired from the bench. 
The court now considers the Motion on its merits. The County claims immunity, 
PAGE 3 OF 21 
lack of notice, and failure to file the required undertaking. Immunity does bar an 
Action related to issuance or failure to issue permits, etc. Plaintiff claims a 
contractual basis for its claim, but the language cited in the Complaint, which is 
excerpted from a Stipulation and Settlement Agreement, merely determines what 
standard will apply. The essence of the claim is still that the County failed to 
issue a permit. (The court agrees with defendant that plaintiffs statement that: 
'The legal reporters are full of Utah Supreme Court decisions on the merits of 
these issues,' is uniquely unhelpful). The County enjoys immunity from such a 
claim, as it does from the damages sought. It is possible that plaintiff does have 
a right to appeal the Countyfs decision under this court's powers to review an 
administrative decision, but this court takes no present position on whether such 
an appeal could still be timely. The court does note that the record reflects notice 
of claim was filed, and the claim was denied on June 14,2000, the same day the 
Complaint was filed. Finally, an undertaking was filed, but it was not timely. 
For the foregoing reasons, the actions for damages must be and hereby is 
DISMISSED, but this dismissal is without prejudice to filing of an appropriate 
appeal, if such an action is timely. In all other respects, the action is 
DISMISSED with prejudiced [sic], based on defendant's immunity. This signed 
Minute Entry shall be the ORDER of the court and no further Order is required." 
Appendix "A" [R. 56 - 58] 
9. January 14,2003: BC&W filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. [R. 59 
- 60]. The motion was fully briefed and oral argument was requested. [R. 61 - 67; 68 - 73; 79 -
81]. 
10. April 4,2003: The trial court heard oral argument on BC&W's motion to alter 
or amend judgment. [R. 133]. 
11. April 2L 2003: The trial court entered the following Order: 
"Before the court is Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment filed 
January 14, 2003, which came regularly on for oral argument on Friday, 
April 4, 2003 at 9:30 a.m. At the hearing, plaintiff John Walsh was 
represented by John Walsh, Esq., appearing pro se, and plaintiff Butler 
Crockett & Walsh Development corporation was represented by Kevin Egan 
Anderson, Esq.. Defendant Salt Lake County ["County"] was represented 
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by Don Hansen, Deputy District Attorney. Plaintiffs' current motion requests 
alteration or amendment of the court's prior Minute Entry and Order dated 
January 3,2003 (attached and incorporated herein as Exhibit "A"), granting 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss dated July 31, 2000. 
"The Court, having reviewed the briefing submitted and having heard the 
arguments of counsel, and finding good cause therefor, hereby FINDS AND 
ORDERS as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs first argue that the issues presented in Defendants' 
motion to dismiss dated July 31,2000 were previously ruled on by 
Judge Homer Wilkinson in a "4-501 Ruling" filed in a case styled 
Butler Crockett and Walsh Development Corporation vs. Thomas 
Johnson, Utah Third District Court Case No. 990912700. 
Plaintiffs argue that Judge Wilkinson's ruling actually applied to 
Defendants' motion to dismiss in the instant case, but was 
inadvertently captioned and filed in the Johnson case. Although 
this contention may well be correct, the Court finds that Judge 
Wilkinson's ruling in the Johnson case was never reduced to a 
signed and entered order and is thus without binding effect. 
Further, this court has the discretion to modify or overrule a prior 
ruling based on an erroneous legal conclusion {see, e.g., Trembly 
v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1311-1312 (Utah App. 
1994)), and finds that it is proper to do so in this case. Therefore, 
this court addresses Plaintiffs' current motion on its merits. 
2. Based upon the reasoning set forth therein, this court affirms its 
January 3, 2003 Minute Entry and Order (Ex. "A") dismissing 
Plaintiffs' breach of contract claims (i.e., first, second and third 
causes of action of Plaintiffs' "Complaint for Declaratory 
Judgment" filed June 14, 2000). Although Plaintiff pleads those 
causes of action as sounding in contract, which would otherwise 
not be subject to governmental immunity by virtue of Utah Code 
Ann. Sec. 63-30-10(3), the court is required to look to the 
underlying alleged conduct or situation out of which plaintiffs 
claim arises when determining the applicability of governmental 
immunity. Bullock v. State Dept. of Transportation, 966 P.2d 
1215, 1217 (Utah App. 1998). Here, the essence of the allegedly 
wrongful conduct by the County is its failure or refusal to issue a 
requested governmental permit, which conduct is undisputedly 
subject to immunity. Plaintiffs now assert, in oral argument on 
their motion, that the remedy they seek is merely the County's 
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reconsideration of their permit application in accordance with 
specified laws as contractually required by a Stipulation and Order 
entered November 29, 1999 in settlement of a prior lawsuit (i.e., 
Butler Crockett and Walsh Development Corp. v. Salt Lake 
County, Utah Third District Court No. 970902479). However, 
Plaintiffs' prayer for relief in the instant case does not seek such a 
remedy, but rather seeks a "declaratory judgment" granting 
Plaintiffs their requested permit, together with $100,000.00 
damages. Thus, Plaintiffs' Complaint requests that the Court 
reverse the County's denial of the permit and award money 
damages, which it cannot do because of governmental immunity. 
Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiffs Complaint seeks relief for 
breach of contract (i.e., the first, second and third causes of action), 
the Court affirms its prior dismissal with prejudice, and Plaintiffs 
motion to amend or alter the Court's January 3,2003 Minute Entry 
and Order in this regard is DENIED. 
3. Plaintiffs argue further that they could amend their complaint as an 
appeal seeking only judicial review of the County's land use 
decision (i.e., denial of Plaintiff s permit application) pursuant to 
Sec. 17-27-1001. The Court finds that, in light of its above ruling, 
such an appeal would be Plaintiffs' proper remedy for the County's 
alleged failure to reconsider Plaintiffs' permit application. The 
Court further finds that its discretion in reviewing the County's 
land use decision in this case is limited to determination of whether 
the decision was "arbitrary, capricious or illegal." Utah Code 
Ann, Sec. 17-27-100l(3)(a)(ii). Because Sec. 17-27-1001 (3)(b) 
provides that "[a] determination of illegality requires that the [land 
use] decision violates a statute, ordinance or existing law," 
Plaintiffs' Fourth, fifth and sixth causes of action could be read to 
state a claim of "illegality" for purposes of an appeal under Sec. 
17-27-1001. Thus, while Plaintiffs' Complaint is not expressly 
framed as an appeal of a land use decision, the Court could treat it 
as such an appeal. The court notes, however, that such an appeal 
is subject to the 30-day filing limitation of Sec. 17-27-1001 (2)(a). 
As there is no evidence presently before the court regarding the 
date of the County's land use decision, the Court takes no position 
as to the timeliness of Plaintiff s fourth, fifth and sixth causes of 
action if they are to be treated as an appeal. Therefore, the Court 
amends its January 3, 2003 Minute Entry and Order to allow 
Plaintiffs to amend their Complaint only so as to present their 
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fourth, fifth and sixth causes of action as an appeal under Sec. 17-
27-1001. Such amendment is to be filed by Plaintiffs within ten 
(10) days after entry of this Order. Defendant shall be permitted to 
file any motions relative to plaintiffs' amended complaint within 
sixty (60) days after the filing of such amended complaint. 
DATED this 21st day of April, 2003. 
By the Court: 
/s/ 
ROBERT K. HILDER 
District Court Judge" 
Appendix "B" [R. 102-106] 
12. BC&W did not file an appeal under Sec. 17-27-1001 as permitted by 
Paragraph 3 of the foregoing Order. BC&W conducted no further litigation 
activity in the case and did not seek a trial setting. [R. 118 - 121] 
13. September 14, 2004: The trial court scheduled an OSC hearing for 
December 10, 2004 at 9:00 a.m., and notified counsel. [R. 107 - 109] 
14. December 10. 2004: The trial court conducted the OSC hearing. Plaintiff 
failed to appear. The County appeared through counsel. [R. 107]. The court 
entered the following minutes regarding the OSC hearing: 
"Plaintiff not present. On motion of Plaintiff [sic], court ordered case 
dismissed with prejudice. Court previously executed an order that left open 
the possibility of Mr. Walsh filing an Amended Complaint as an appear [sic] 
of administrative order. He did not do so. Mr. Hansen to prepare order." [R. 
107] 
15. December 20, 2004: The trial court dismissed the action with prejudice, 
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entering the following Order: 
"Pursuant to the court's Notice of Order to Show Cause dated 
September 14, 2004, the above entitled matter came on for hearing on 
Friday, December 10,2004 at 8:15 a.m.. Appearing for defendant Salt Lake 
County was Don Hansen, Deputy District Attorney, Salt Lake County 
District Attorney's Office, Litigation Division. No one appeared for the 
Plaintiff. 
The court notes that it entered an Order Regarding Plaintiffs 
Motion to Amend or Alter Judgment on April 21, 2003 which permitted 
Plaintiff to file an amended complaint with respect to Plaintiffs fourth, fifth 
and sixth causes of action within ten (10) days after entry of said order. 
Since that time, Plaintiff has failed to file either an amended complaint or 
any other pleading in this case. 
Accordingly, based upon the Plaintiffs failure to file its amended 
complaint within the time permitted under the court's prior order, and its 
failure to prosecute this action, and its failure to appear pursuant to notice 
and show cause why this action should not be dismissed, the court hereby 
ORDERS that the complaint herein is hereby DISMISSED WITH 
PREJUDICE. 
DATED this 17th day of December, 2003 [sic; filed December 20, 2004]. 
By the Court: 
1st 
ROBERT K. HILDER 
District Court Judge" 
Appendix "C" [R. 118-119] 
There is no indication in the record that BC&W ever (a) sought to reschedule 
the OSC hearing, (b) moved for relief from the order under UtahR.Civ.P., 
Rule 61, or (c) that it ever requested reconsideration of the dismissal or 
attempted to demonstrate excusable neglect for its failure to prosecute the 
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action and its failure to appear at the OSC hearing. 
17. January 14, 2005: BC&W filed its Notice of Appeal and Appellate Bond 
herein. [R. 120 - 123] 
ARGUMENT 
1 
The Trial Court's Dismissal of Plaintiffs' First, Second and 
Third Causes of Action Was Proper 
BC&W argues that the trial court erred in dismissing its first, second and third causes 
of action for failure to file a notice of claim and an undertaking as required under the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act ["Immunity Act"], Utah Code Ann., §§ 63-30-11 and 63-30-192. 
In substance, BC&W alleged that in November, 1999, the County entered into a settlement 
agreement in a previous lawsuit in which it agreed to consider BC&W's conditional use 
application under an earlier version of the zoning ordinance. The County had moved for 
dismissal on the grounds that BC&W failed to provide a notice of claim and undertaking as 
required by the Immunity Act3. It also moved for dismissal based on the immunity retained 
under the Immunity Act for denial of a permit. See, Utah Code Ann., § 63-30-10(3)4. 
2Renumbered in 2004 to §§63-30d-403 and 63-30d-601(2), respectively. 
3It is not disputed in this case that failure to conform to the procedural mandates of the 
Immunity Act, where applicable, deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., 
Buckner v. Kennard, 99 P.3d 842, 851 (Utah 2004). 
4Renumbered §63-30d-301(5)(c). 
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In essence, BC&W claims that these three causes of action are based on a "contract" 
theory of recovery and are therefore not subject to the provisions of the Immunity Act, pursuant 
to Sec. 63-30-5(l)5. In effect, BC&W's argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in 
applying the Immunity Act provisions because this is a contract action, not one governed by the 
Immunity Act. However, the trial correctly looked beyond the form of BC&W's pleadings and 
analyzed the substantive character of the claims asserted, and relief sought, by BC&W. Thus, 
the trial court correctly perceived the action as one subject to the Immunity Act. The trial court 
noted that 
"[although Plaintiff pleads those causes of action as sounding in contract, which 
would otherwise not be subject to governmental immunity... the court is required to 
look to the underlying alleged conduct or situation out of which plaintiffs claim arises 
when determining the applicability of governmental immunity. Bullock v. State Dept. 
of Transportation, 966 P.2d 1215, 1217 (Utah App. 1998). Here, the essence of the 
allegedly wrongful conduct by the County is its failure or refusal to issue a requested 
governmental permit, which conduct is undisputedly subject to immunity. Plaintiffs 
now assert, in oral argument on their motion, that the remedy they seek is merely the 
County's reconsideration of their permit application in accordance with specified laws 
as contractually required by a Stipulation and Order entered November 29, 1999 in 
settlement of a prior lawsuit (i.e., Butler Crockett and Walsh Development Corp. v. 
Salt Lake County, Utah Third District Court No. 970902479). However, Plaintiffs' 
prayer for relief in the instant case does not seek such a remedy, but rather seeks a 
"declaratory judgment" granting Plaintiffs their requested permit, together with 
$100,000.00 damages. Thus, Plaintiffs' Complaint requests that the Court reverse the 
County's denial of the permit and award money damages, which it cannot do because 
of governmental immunity." 
Consequently, the trial court correctly held that BC&W' s claims seeking monetary and 
declaratory relief were not truly "contractual," because BC&W was not seeking the 
5As renumbered, §63-30d-301(l). 
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"reconsideration"of its permit application allegedly promised by the County in the settlement 
agreement. Instead, BC&W sought a court order actually granting the permit, together with 
money damages. In other words, BC&W's lawsuit did not seek enforcement of the contract 
with the County; rather, it sought remedies for denial of the permit. 
In Bullock v. State Dept. of Transportation, 966 P.2d 1215, 1217 (Utah App. 1998), 
cited by the trial court, a partner challenged a sale of partnership property by other partners to 
UDOT. He attempted to evade the procedural requirements of the Immunity Act by 
characterizing his claim against UDOT as one in contract. However, the court determined that 
the essence of his claim against UDOT was that UDOT was in wrongful possession of the 
property, a claim governed by Sec. 63-30-6. The court noted that 
"'[t]he structure of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act... focuses on the 
conduct or situation out of which the injury arose, not on the theory of 
liability crafted by the plaintiff or the type of negligence alleged.' Ledfors 
v. Emery County Sch. Dist, 849 P.2d 1162, 1166 (Utah 1993). Numerous 
Utah cases have established the principle that' [a] plaintiffs claim should be 
refused when it is drafted in an attempt to 'evade [the Act's] statutory 
categories by recharacterizing the supposed cause of the injury.' (quoting de 
Villiers v. Utah County, 882 P.2d 1161, 1166 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (citation 
omitted)." 
Here, BC&W sought monetary damages allegedly arising out of the County's failure 
to issue a conditional use permit for BC&W's use of its property as a Tourist Home. While 
couched as a claim for "contractual" relief, the action is, at its core, a claim for monetary 
damages allegedly resulting not from breach of any alleged agreement, but rather from the 
denial of the CUP application. Thus, the trial court correctly determined that the action was one 
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for damages allegedly arising from a failure to issue a permit, for which immunity is expressly 
retained under the Immunity Act6. 
Therefore, the trial court correctly dismissed BC&W's first, second and third causes 
of action based upon immunity retained by, and failure to comply with the procedural 
requirements of, the Immunity Act.. 
2 
The Trial Court Correctly Dismissed BC&W's 
Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action 
The trial court determined that BC&W's third cause of action ("arbitrary, capricious 
and illegal"), fifth cause of action ("due process"), and sixth cause of action (the County 
"violated the Plaintiffs civil rights as violated 42 USC 1983 and related states and 
regulations"^/*:)) could form the basis of a land use appeal under Section 17-27-1001, and 
allowed BC&W ten days to amend its complaint accordingly. However, BC&W never amended 
it complaint as a land use appeal. 
BC&W now argues, in effect, that it was not required to assert its fourth, fifth and 
sixth causes of action as a land use appeal because Section 17-27-1001, which governs such an 
appeal, does not provide an "exclusive remedy." Instead, BC&W argues, Section 17-27-1002 
provides an alternative form avenue of relief and is "controlling" here. See, Appellant's Brief, 
pp. 46 - 48. As explained below, BC&W fundamentally misapprehends the purpose and 
6See, Utah Code Ann., §63-30-10(3) ("Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived ... except if the injury arises out of... the issuance [or] denial... of any 
permit... ."). 
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application of Section 17-27-1002. That section provides as follows: 
"Enforcement 
(l)(a) A county, county attorney or any owner of real estate within the 
county in which violations of this chapter or ordinance enacted under the 
authority of this chapter occur or are about to occur may, in addition to other 
remedies provided by law, institute: 
(i) injunctions, mandamus, abatement, or any other appropriate actions; or 
(ii) proceedings to prevent, enjoin, abate or remove the unlawful building, 
use or act." 
BC&W is attempting to apply a statute which has no application in the instant case. 
Based on its plain language, this section applies only where a party has violated "this chapter" 
or an ordinance adopted under "this chapter." The phrase "this chapter" refers to Chapter 27 of 
Title 17, entitled the "County Land Use Development and Management Act" ["Act"]. The Act 
provides, inter alia, for land use planning and regulation by counties, creates a planning 
commission and board of adjustment for each county, requires each county to create a "general 
plan" for land use development, and allows counties to enact zoning ordinances. Hence, while 
Section 17-27-1001 governs appeals of county land use decisions in district court, Section 17-
27-1002, relied on here by BC&W, only permits a county or a property owner to bring an action 
for injunctive relief to prevent or correct a non-conforming land use by another party. Thus, for 
example, a property owner may bring an action to prevent or halt construction of a building by 
a neighboring land owner which would otherwise violate a zoning restriction. BC& W s attempt 
to apply this section here is flawed in two respects. 
First, BC&W has neither alleged, nor offered any evidence of, any violation of "this 
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chapter" by any party. Rather, the thrust of BC&W s allegations is that the County's denial of 
its CUP application have caused BC&W damages of at least $100,000. Therefore, BC&W does 
not claim that the County or any other party has violated any zoning restriction or other land use 
regulation. BC&W simply claims that it has been damaged by the County's denial of the 
permit, which is a classic "takings" claim or land use appeal. However, BC&W did not frame 
its action as one for takings relief or as an appeal of a land use decision. 
Second, Section 17-27-1001 does not provide for recovery of money damages. The 
remedies sought by BC&W are (1) a declaratory judgment effectively granting BC&W its 
requested conditional use permit, and (2) at least $100,000 in damages. Clearly, however, 
Section 17-27-1002 does not provide for the kinds of relief sought by BC&W7. 
BC&W asserts that the County's position, adopted by the trial court, that the fourth, 
fifth and sixth causes of action could have been brought as "illegality" claims under Section 17-
27-1001(3)(a)(ii), effectively leaves BC&W without any remedy at all8. Appellant's Brief, p. 
42. This assertion rings hollow. All BC&W needed to do was to bring its land use appeal 
7While Section 17-27-1002(l)(a)(i) permits actions for "injunctions, mandamus, 
abatement, or any other appropriate actions" (emphasis added), it does not allow recovery of 
money damages, nor does it expressly permit declaratory relief. 
8Here, BC&W confuses the possible modes of relief which may be available to an 
aggrieved property owner. It claims that under the view taken by the County and the trial court, 
the County "could orchestrate an impossible timing requirement of every Appellant merely by 
not denying a claim until after the thirty days had run under [Section] 17-27-1001." Appellant's 
Brief, p. 42. BC&W seems to believe that a land use appeal under Sectionl 7-27-1001 is 
intertwined with an action governed by the Immunity Act. Actually, the two are entirely 
independent. Further, BC&W conspicuously fails to respond at all to the trial court's 
determination that an action for damages flowing from a government's denial of a permit is 
barred by Section 63-30-10(3) of the Immunity Act. 
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within the thirty-day limitation period provided by the statute. Evidently, BC&W chose not to 
amend its complaint to serve as an appeal of a county land use decision under Section 17-27-
1001 as permitted by the trial court because it knew that it had not filed this action originally 
within the time allowed for such appeals. 
What apparently happened in this case is simply that when BC&W's permit 
application was denied, BC&W failed to bring an appropriate and timely claim for relief. It 
could have filed a land use appeal under Section 17-27-1001 within thirty-days after the County 
denied its permit application, but failed to do so. It could have brought a "takings" action or 
filed an administrative appeal under the County's "takings relief ordinance, but failed to do 
so. Now, it is forcing a square factual peg into a round legal hole by attempting to apply 
Section 17-27-1002 — which does not have the 30-day limitation period contained in Section 
17-27-1001 — to facts which clearly preclude its application. BC&W's current legal 
contortions are really a veiled effort to evade the consequences of its own failure to seek relief 
in a timely and legally appropriate manner. 
3 
The Trial Court's Dismissal for Failure to Prosecute BC&W's 
Action was a Proper Exercise of Judicial Discretion 
On April 21,2004, BC&W was allowed by the trial court to file an amended complaint 
as to its fourth, fifth and sixth causes of action. BC&W did not do so. In fact, it filed no further 
pleadings or motions at all. It did not seek a trial date. And, after the case remained dormant 
for over twenty months, the trial court duly noticed the matter for an OSC hearing (giving 
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nearly three months advance notice), but BC&W failed to appear. After conducting the hearing 
and making a record, the trial court then ordered that 
"based upon the Plaintiffs failure to file its amended complaint within the 
time permitted under the court's prior order, and its failure to prosecute this 
action, and its failure to appear pursuant to notice and show cause why this 
action should not be dismissed, the court hereby ORDERS that the complaint 
herein is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE." [R. 118 - 121]. 
(Emphasis added). There is no indication in the record that BC&W ever (a) sought to postpone 
the OSC hearing, (b) moved for relief from the order under UtahR.Civ.P., Rule 61, or (c) that 
it ever requested reconsideration of the dismissal or attempted to excuse its failure to prosecute 
the action or its failure to appear at the OSC hearing. 
A trial court's dismissal for failure to prosecute is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
See supra, p. 1; see also, Rohan v. Boseman, 46 P.3d 753, 756, 2002 UT App 109. ^ [15 (Utah 
App. 2002), Brown v. Glover, 16 P.3d 540,2000 UT 89, Tf43, Harmon v. Greenwood, 596 P.2d 
636, 639-640 (Utah 1979). Motions for failure to prosecute are held to an "excusable neglect" 
standard. Utah R.Civ.P., Rule 60(b); Meadow Fresh Farms, Inc. v. Utah State University, 813 
P.2dl216,1218- 1219(UtahApp. 1991). Establishing "excusable neglect" requires a showing 
a "special circumstances," Reisbeck v. HCA Health Services of Utah, Inc., 2 P.3d 447, 450, 
2000 UT 48, Tf 13 (Utah 2000), and requires more than "the usual excuse that the lawyer was too 
busy" to comply with filing deadlines. Prowswood, Inc. v. Mtn. Fuel Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952, 
959 (Utah 1991). A party challenging a dismissal for failure to prosecute has the burden of 
"offering reasonable excuse for [its] lack of diligence." Rohan, supra, 46 P.3d at 758,2002 UT 
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App at T[28. In this case, BC&W's appeal ignores the entire "failure to prosecute" issue, and 
makes no attempt to show "excusable neglect." 
In Rohan v. Boseman, supra, the plaintiff was an attorney claiming personal injuries 
suffered in a vehicle accident. After numerous pretrial motions and having discharged his 
attorneys, the plaintiff appeared pro se at trial, but claimed that because of his brain injury, he 
was unable to proceed, and he renewed a motion for continuance which he had filed 18 days 
before trial. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to prosecute. The trial court denied 
plaintiff s requested continuance, granted dismissal with prejudice and awarded the defendants' 
attorney fees and costs. Id., at 755 - 756, ^ [2 -14. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed, noting 
that 
"we consider the following factors in determining the trial court exceeded 
its discretion in dismissing [the] action: (1) The conduct of both parties; (2) 
the opportunity each party has had to move the case forward; (3) what each 
of the parties has done to move the case forward; (4) what difficulty or 
prejudice may have been caused to the other side; and (5) most important, 
whether injustice may result from the dismissal." Id.. 
In the present case, BC&W has made no effort whatsoever on appeal to establish 
excusable neglect for failing to prosecute this action in the trial court and for failing to appear 
at the OSC hearing. BC&W completely disregards the basis of the trial court's dismissal of its 
action and, instead, effectively asks the court of appeals to relieve it of the results of its own 
failure to seek timely relief. BC&W's dramatic contention that "this matter was decided 
without any kind of trial and without any evidence being submitted to the Court"9 rings hollow. 
9Appellant's Brief, p. 40. 
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BC&W has nobody but itself to blame for this fact. After BC&W moved to alter or amend the 
dismissal of its action, the trial court allowed BC&W to amend its complaint as a land use 
appeal regarding its fourth, fifth and sixth causes of action. However, without explanation, 
BC&W failed to do so. Twenty months then passed, during which BC&W did nothing to 
advance the litigation. BC&W requested no discovery, took no deposition and filed no motions. 
Then, when the court scheduled the OSC hearing - giving almost three months advance notice 
- BC&W simply failed (again, without explanation) to appear or request a continuance of the 
hearing. It certainly seems that after the court's April 21, 2003 ruling, BC&W showed no 
further interest in advancing this case - until it received notice that the action had been 
dismissed with prejudice. Not only did BC&W fail to file an amended complaint as Judge 
Hilder allowed; it failed to take any further action on this case. 
In short, BC&W fails to carry its burden to show that the trial court abused its 
discretion in dismissing the action for failure to prosecute, or to establish excusable neglect for 
its failure to prosecute. BC&W fails to make even the most meager effort to explain why the 
trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the action. BC&W also fails to preserve any 
argument concerning the failure to prosecute issue by addressing the issue in its opening brief. 
It would be fundamentally unfair to the County for BC&W to finally address this issue for the 
first time in its reply brief before this court10. Having failed to make any effort to establish 
10
 UtahR.App. P., Rule 24(c) provides that "[r]eply briefs shall have limited to 
answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief." The arguments set forth herein 
are not "new matters." They are all discussed at length in the trial court's orders. 
Moreover, any issue which is not preserved by discussion in the appellant's opening brief 
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grounds for reversal of the trial court's exercise of its discretion, BC&W should not be allowed 
further opportunity to impose additional unjustified burdens on the County. The Court of 
Appeals should, therefore, affirm the trial court's dismissal with prejudice for failure to 
prosecute. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's dismissal of BC&W's first, second and third causes of action was 
proper because these claims sought money damages allegedly flowing from the County's denial 
of a conditional use permit, and an order granting the permit, but were framed as "contractual" 
claims merely to evade the requirements of the Immunity Act. Additionally, the dismissal of 
the fourth, fifth and sixth causes of action was proper because the trial court allowed BC&W 
to amend its complaint to serve as an appeal of a county land use decision under Section 17-27-
1001, but BC&W failed to do so. 
A trial court's dismissal of an action for failure to prosecute is subject to an "abuse of 
discretion" standard of appellate review. BC&W's appeal fails to address its failure to 
prosecute this action, and fails to offer any factual or legal basis upon which the appellate courts 
could conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing BC&W's fourth, fifth and 
is considered waived on appeal. Utah R. App. P., Rule 24(a)(5). Gildea v. Guardian title 
Co. of Utah, 31 P.3d 543, 546 n. 1, 2001 UT 75, ^ [10 (Utah 2001); Brown v. Glover, 2000 
UT 89,1J23, 16 P.3d 540, 545 (Utah 2000) (arguments not presented in an appellant's 
opening brief are waived); see also, Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 679 
(10th Cir. 1998); and Coleman v. B-G Maintenance Mgmt. of Colo., Inc. 108 F.3d 1199, 
1205 (10th Cir. 1997)("arguments not adequately briefed by an appellant in the opening 
brief are waived" (interpreting Fed.R. App.P., Rule 28(a)(5), the federal counterpart to 
Utah R. App. P , Rule 24(a)(5)). 
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sixth causes of action. Therefore, the dismissal of the action should be affirmed. 
DATED this day of May, 2005. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
By: 
^ iLLlH. HANSEN 
Deputy District Attorney 
Litigation Division 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE SALT LAKE COUNTY 
was mailed by U.S. First Class Mail, postage prepaid (2 copies) to: 
John Walsh, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
2319 South Foothill Drive 
Suite 270 
Salt Lake City UT 84109 
Attorney for Appellant 
On this i 1 day of f \V l" | 200 
( I 
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APPENDIX "A" 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BULTER CROCKETT AND WALSH DEVE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 
Case No: 000904688 
Judge: ROBERT K. HILDER 
Date: 01/03/2003 
Clerk: rhilder 
Defendant has submitted its Motion to Dismiss for decision, for a 
second time. The case, and the Motion, has languished for over two 
years. The prior judge apparently never saw the Motion, and he 
subsequently retired from the bench. The court now considers the 
Motion on its merits. The County claims immunity, lack of notice, 
and failure to file the required undertaking. Immunity does bar an 
action related to issuance or failure to issue permits, etc. 
Plaintiff claims a contractual basis for its claim, but the 
language cited in the Complaint, which is excerpted from a 
Stipulation and Settlement Agreement, merely determines what 
standard will apply. The essence of the claim is still that the 
County failed to issue a permit. (The court agrees with defendant 
that plaintiff's statement that: "The legal reporters are full of 
Utah Supreme Court decisions on the merits of these issues," is 
uniquely unhelpful). The County enjoys immunity from such a claim, 
as it does from the damages sought. It is possible that plaintiff 
does have a right to appeal the County's decision under this 
court's powers to review an administrative decision, but this court 
takes no present position on whether such an appeal could still be 
timely. The court does note that the record reflects notice of 
claim was filed, and the claim was denied on June 14, 2000, the 
same day the Complaint was filed. Finally, an undertaking was 
filed, but it was not timely. For the foregoing reasons, the 
actions for damages must be and hereby is DISMISSED, but this 
dismissal is without prejudice to filing of an appropriate appeal, 
if such an action is timely. In all other respects, the action is 
DISMISSED with prejudiced, based on defendant's immunity. This 
signed Minute Entry shall be the ORDER of the court and no further 
Order is required. 
Case No 
Date : 
000904688 
Jan 03, 2003 
fl ^ ^ 4 - \ 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 000904688 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail KEVIN EGAN ANDERSON 
ATTORNEY PLA 
60 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE 
#1270 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
Mail DAVID E. YOCOM 
ATTORNEY DEF 
2001 S. STATE ST. 
#S3500 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84190 
Dated this Up day of {^AJJAJO/ 
• ^-.^SSSSSK^ 
APPENDIX "B" 
DAVE) E. YOCOM (USB # 3581) 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
DON HANSEN (USB # 1332) 
Deputy District Attorney 
2001 South State Street #S3400 
Salt Lake City UT 84190-1200 
Telephone: (801) 468-2631 
Facsimile: (801) 468-2622 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BUTLER, CROCKETT AND WALSH 
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body corporate 
and politic of the State of Utah, 
ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO AMEND OR ALTER 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 000904688 
Judge ROBERT K. HILDER 
Defendant 
Before the court is Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment filed January 14, 2003, 
which came regularly on for oral argument on Friday, April 4, 2003 at 9:30 a.m. At the hearing, 
plaintiff John Walsh was represented by John Walsh, Esq., appearing pro se, and plaintiff Butler 
Crockett & Walsh Development corporation was represented by Kevin Egan Anderson, Esq.. 
Defendant Salt Lake County ["County"] was represented by Don Hansen, Deputy District Attorney. 
Plaintiffs' current motion requests alteration or amendment of the court's prior Minute Entry and 
I T LAKE COUNTV 
Deputy Clerk 
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Order dated January 3,2003 (attached and incorporated herein as Exhibit "A"), granting Defendant5 s 
Motion to Dismiss dated July 31, 2000. 
The Court, having reviewed the briefing submitted and having heard the arguments of 
counsel, and finding good cause therefor, hereby FINDS AND ORDERS as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs first argue that the issues presented in Defendants' motion to dismiss dated 
July 31, 2000 were previously ruled on by Judge Homer Wilkinson in a "4-501 
Ruling" filed in a case styled Butler Crockett and Walsh Development Corporation 
vs. Thomas Johnson, Utah Third District Court Case No. 990912700. Plaintiffs 
argue that Judge Wilkinson's ruling actually applied to Defendants' motion to 
dismiss in the instant case, but was inadvertently captioned and filed in the Johnson 
case. Although this contention may well be correct, the Court finds that Judge 
Wilkinson's ruling in the Johnson case was never reduced to a signed and entered 
order and is thus without binding effect. Further, this court has the discretion to 
modify or overrule a prior ruling based on an erroneous legal conclusion (see, e.g., 
Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884P.2d 1306,1311-1312 (Utah App. 1994)), and 
finds that it is proper to do so in this case. Therefore, this court addresses Plaintiffs' 
current motion on its merits. 
2. Based upon the reasoning set forth therein, this court affirms its January 3, 2003 
Minute Entry and Order (Ex. "A") dismissing Plaintiffs' breach of contract claims 
(i. e., first, second and third causes of action of Plaintiffs' "Complaint for Declaratory 
Judgment" filed June 14,2000). Although Plaintiff pleads those causes of action as 
sounding in contract, which would otherwise not be subject to governmental 
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immunity by virtue of Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-30-10(3), the court is required to look 
to the underlying alleged conduct or situation out of which plaintiffs claim arises 
when determining the applicability of governmental immunity. Bullock v. State Dept 
of Transportation,^? 2& 1215,1217(UtahApp. 1998). Here, the essence of the 
allegedly wrongful conduct by the County is its failure or refusal to issue a requested 
governmental permit, which conduct is undisputedly subject to immunity. Plaintiffs 
now assert, in oral argument on their motion, that the remedy they seek is merely the 
County's reconsideration of their permit application in accordance with specified 
laws as contractually required by a Stipulation and Order entered November 29,1999 
in settlement of a prior lawsuit (i.e., Butler Crockett and Walsh Development Corp. 
v. Salt Lake County,mahThirdDistrictCourtNo. 970902479). However,Plaintiffs' 
prayer for relief in the instant case does not seek such a remedy, but rather seeks a 
"declaratory judgment" granting Plaintiffs their requested permit, together with 
$100,000.00 damages. Thus, Plaintiffs' Complaint requests that the Court reverse 
the County's denial of the permit and award money damages, which it cannot do 
because of governmental immunity. Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiffs 
Complaint seeks relief for breach of contract (i.e., the first, second and third causes 
of action), the Court affirms its prior dismissal with prejudice, and Plaintiffs motion 
to amend or alter the Court's January 3,2003 Minute Entry and Order in this regard 
is DENIED. 
3. Plaintiffs argue further that they could amend their complaint as an appeal seeking 
only judicial review of the County's land use decision (i.e., denial of Plaintiff s 
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permit application) pursuant to Sec. 17-27-1001. The Court finds that, in light of its 
above ruling, such an appeal would be Plaintiffs' proper remedy for the County's 
alleged failure to reconsider Plaintiffs' permit application. The Court further finds 
that its discretion in reviewing the County's land use decision in this case is limited 
to determination of whether the decision was "arbitrary, capricious or illegal." Utah 
Code Ann., Sec. 17-27-1001 (3)(a)(ii). BecauseSec. 17-27-1001 (3 )(b) provides that 
"[a] determination of illegality requires that the [land use] decision violates a statute, 
ordinance or existing law," Plaintiffs' Fourth, fifth and sixth causes of action could 
be read to state a claim of "illegality" for purposes of an appeal under Sec. 17-27-
1001. Thus, while Plaintiffs' Complaint is not expressly framed as an appeal of a 
land use decision, the Court could treat it as such an appeal. The court notes, 
however, that such an appeal is subject to the 30-day filing limitation of Sec. 17-27-
1001(2)(a). As there is no evidence presently before the court regarding the date of 
the County's land use decision, the Court takes no position as to the timeliness of 
Plaintiffs fourth, fifth and sixth causes of action if they are to be treated as an appeal^ 
Therefore, the Court amends its January 3,2003 Minute Entry and Order to 
allow Plaintiffs to amend their Complaint only so as to present their fourth, fifth and 
sixth causes of action as an appeal under Sec. 17-27-1001. Such amendment is to be 
filed by Plaintiffs within ten (10) days after entry of this Order. Defendant shall be 
permitted to file any motions relative to plaintiffs' amended complaint within sixty 
(60) days after the filing of such amended complaint. 
/ / 
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Approved as to form and content: 
JOHN WALSH, ESQ. 
Attorney for Plaintiff John Walsh 
KEVIN EGAN ANDERSON 
Attorneys for Defendant Butler, Crockett and Walsh Development Corp. 
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APPENDIX "C 
DAVID E. YOCOM (USB # 3581) 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
DON HANSEN (USB # 1332) 
Deputy District Attorney 
2001 South State Street #S3400 
Salt Lake City UT 84190-1200 
Telephone: (801) 468-2631 
Facsimile: (801) 468-2622 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Third JucX '» ' v > 
DEC I , 23tt 
SALT LAKE COUk'TY 
DofiUty CScrk 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BUTLER, CROCKETT AND WALSH 
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body corporate 
and politic of the State of Utah, 
Defendant 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH 
PREJUDICE 
Civil No. 000904688 
Judge ROBERT K. HILDER 
Pursuant to the court's Notice of Order to Show Cause dated September 14,2004. the above 
entitled matter came on for hearing on Friday, December 10, 2004 at 8:15 a.m.. Appearing for 
defendant Salt Lake County was Don Hansen, Deputy District Attorney, Salt Lake County District 
Attorney's Office, Litigation Division. No one appeared for the Plaintiff. 
The court notes that it entered an Order Regarding Plaintiffs Motion to Amend or Alter 
Judgment on April 21,2003 which permitted Plaintiff to file an amended complaint with respect to 
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Plaintiffs fourth, fifth and sixth causes of action within ten (10) days after entry of said order. Since 
that time, Plaintiff has failed to file either an amended complaint or any other pleading in this case. 
Accordingly, based upon the Plaintiffs failure to file its amended complaint within the time 
permitted under the court's prior order, and its failure to prosecute this action, and its failure to 
appear pursuant to notice and show cause why this action should not be dismissed, the court hereby 
ORDERS that the complaint herein is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
DATED this / 7 ^ ~ day oi^UJ^^^^ , 2003. 
By the Court: 
EGBERT K. HILSEST 
District Court Judge 
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